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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3830 
 ___________ 
 
 DAVID C. ONYIUKE, 
        Appellant 
 v. 
 
 CHEAP TICKETS, INC.; VIRGIN ATLANTIC LTD. 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-00891) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Katharine S. Hayden  
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 1, 2011 
 Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges 







  Appellant David C. Onyiuke, proceeding pro se, appeals from the orders of 
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his complaint 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denying his motion for reconsideration.  For the 





  In April 2009, Onyiuke filed an amended complaint against Virgin Atlantic 
Ltd. (“Virgin Atlantic”) and Trip Network, Inc. d/b/a Cheaptickets.com (“Cheaptickets”), 
alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and 
conversion, arising from the cancellation of service between Newark Liberty 
International Airport and Gatwick Airport in London, England.   
  In August 2008, Onyiuke purchased plane tickets through the online travel 
site Cheaptickets.com.  Under to the flight arrangement, he was scheduled to fly from 
Newark to London on December 12, 2008 on a plane owned and operated by Continental 
Airlines, which undertakes certain flight obligations from Virgin Atlantic.  Onyiuke was 
then scheduled to fly – via Virgin Nigeria Airlines – to Lagos, Nigeria, his final 
destination.  Under the arrangement, Onyiuke would embark on a return flight to New 
Jersey on January 12, 2009.  He paid a total of $1,563.70 for the tickets. 
  On or about November 7, 2008, Continental Airlines discontinued service 
between Newark and Gatwick Airport.  Cheaptickets notified Onyiuke about this change 
in service on December 3, 2008 and offered a modified flight arrangement whereby 
Onyiuke would have to provide his own transportation from Heathrow Airport to 
Gatwick Airport in order to catch his connecting flight to Nigeria.  Alternatively, 





  The following day, Onyiuke contacted Cheaptickets customer service and 
was again offered a refund.  After refusing to accept Cheaptickets’ refund offer for a third 
time, Onyiuke booked his flights with a different travel agency for $3,163.29 and 
initiated suit against Cheaptickets and Virgin Atlantic.    
  The Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that the District Court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Onyiuke’s claims because the amended complaint 
failed to satisfy the amount of money in controversy required under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  
The Court granted the motions, concluding that the amount in controversy did not meet 
the minimum jurisdictional amount.  Onyiuke filed a motion for reconsideration, which 
the District Court denied.  Onyiuke appeals. 
II. 
  We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review a District Court’s determination of its jurisdiction de novo.  See Emerald Investors 
Trust v. Gaunt Parsippany Partners, 492 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 2007).  To the extent that 
a District Court makes factual findings in determining jurisdiction, we review for clear 
error.  Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & Assocs., Inc., 149 F.3d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 1998). 
We will not disturb the factual findings of the District Court unless we are “left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” in the District Court’s 




  Diversity jurisdiction requires that the controversy be between citizens of 
different states, and that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a)(1).  Whether diversity jurisdiction exists is determined by examining “the facts 
as they exist when the complaint is filed.”  Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 
U.S. 826, 830 (1989); Grand Union Supermarkets of the V.I., Inc. v. H.E. Lockhart 
Mgmt., Inc., 316 F.3d 408, 410 (3d Cir. 2003).   
  In determining whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the 
Court generally accepts the plaintiff’s good faith allegations.  Columbia Gas 
Transmission Corp. v. Tarbuck, 62 F.3d 538, 541 (3d Cir. 1995).  However, the case may 
be dismissed for failure to meet the amount in controversy requirement if it appears to a 
“legal certainty” that the claim is for less than the jurisdictional amount.  St. Paul 
Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938); Dardovitch v. Haltzman, 
190 F.3d 125, 135 (3d Cir. 1999).  It necessarily follows that whether the claims are for 
less than the jurisdictional amount depends on what damages a plaintiff could 
conceivably recover under state law.  Suber v. Chrysler Corp., 104 F.3d 578, 584 (3d Cir. 
1997).  When punitive damages are recoverable, they are properly considered in 
determining whether the jurisdictional amount has been satisfied, see Packard v. 
Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1046 (3d Cir. 1993), but when a claim for punitive 
damages is frivolous, “such damages are unavailable as a matter of law” and “that claim 




  Onyiuke sought identical damages of $127,793.57 from each defendant, a 
sum composed of nominal, actual, and special contract damages; punitive damages; 
damages for mental agony; and litigation expenses.  Notably, of the $127,793.57 that 
Onyiuke sought from each Defendant, he allotted more than $87,000 to his conversion 
claim (with $80,000 representing punitive damages), and more than $40,000 to his breach 
of contract claim (with $25,000 representing his mental agony damages).  After 
reviewing the record, we conclude that the District Court did not err in determining that 
the amount in controversy did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement.   
  First, assuming that punitive damages are recoverable in New Jersey for the 
tort claim of conversion, such damages may only be awarded if a plaintiff demonstrates 
by “clear and convincing evidence, that the harm [he] suffered was the result of the 
defendant’s acts or omissions, and [that] such acts or omissions were actuated by actual 
malice or accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of persons who foreseeably 
might be harmed by those acts or omissions.”  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-5.12(a).1   
  We agree with the District Court that Onyiuke failed to allege facts 
sufficient to demonstrate that the Defendants acted with the requisite malice or willful 
disregard to justify his demand for punitive damages arising from the alleged conversion 
                                                 
1
  Actual malice is defined as “an intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an evil-minded 
act.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-5.10.  Furthermore, wanton and willful disregard is a 
“deliberate act or omission with knowledge of a high degree of probability of harm to 
another and reckless indifference to the consequences of such act or omission.”  Id. 
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of $1,563.70.  As the District Court noted, Onyiuke’s claims arise from his dissatisfaction 
with the changes to his itinerary, the refund policy in place, and the unwillingness of the 
Defendants to meet his demands.  Such allegations do not support a claim for punitive 
damages as defined under the statute. 
  We now turn to Onyiuke’s request for damages of $25,000 from each 
Defendant for mental agony arising from the alleged breach of contract.  Contrary to 
Onyiuke’s assertion, the District Court applied the correct legal standard to evaluate his 
claim.  The Court correctly observed that, under New Jersey law, a plaintiff may recover 
for emotional distress damages resulting from a breach of contract where the breach was 
“both intentional and outrageous and proximately cause[d] severe, foreseeable emotional 
distress.”  See Picogna v. Bd. of Educ., 671 A.2d 1035, 1037 (N.J. 1996).  The “conduct 
must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible 
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community.”  Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc’y, 544 A.2d 857, 863 (N.J. 1988) 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46). 
  We agree that Onyiuke failed to allege intentional conduct on the part of the 
Defendants so outrageous as to cause emotional distress.  Although Onyiuke was 
undoubtedly inconvenienced by the cancellation of his flight, “complaints [that] amount 
to nothing more than aggravation, embarrassment, an unspecified number of headaches, 
and loss of sleep” do not amount to severe emotional distress.  Id. at 864.  Indeed, 
Onyiuke ultimately traveled to Nigeria as planned and also declined Defendants’ offer to 
7 
 
reimburse him for the cost of his alternate travel arrangements. 
  Without the demands for punitive damages and damages for mental agony, 
the amount in controversy does not meet the threshold amount for diversity jurisdiction.  
Thus, we find no error in the District Court’s decision to dismiss the amended complaint 
for lack of jurisdiction.  In addition, we discern no abuse of discretion in the District 
Court’s denial of Onyiuke’s motion for reconsideration.  Onyiuke did not demonstrate 
any basis for granting the motion, such as intervening change in controlling law, new 
evidence, or the need to correct clear error of law or fact or prevent manifest injustice.  
See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010).   
  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders of the District Court. 
 
